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Fiduciary Society Unleashed: The Road Ahead for
the Financial Sector
By Edward J. Waitzer* and Douglas Sarro**
Informational asymmetries, misaligned incentives, and artificially elongated chains of in-
termediation have created a disconnect between the financial sector and the “real economy”
that is detrimental to the public interest. Courts and regulators are increasingly intervening
to break the cycle. We argue that fiduciary law offers a conceptual framework both for
understanding and responding to this trend, and that the financial sector, rather than wait-
ing for this trend to develop and reacting to new rules in a piecemeal way, should be proac-
tive and try to shape the way in which this trend develops. We describe some elements of
what such an approach might look like, and consider how regulators and political institu-
tions can encourage financial institutions to adopt this approach, and in so doing support a
broader transition to a more sustainable economy.
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INTRODUCTION
Society faces increasingly complex governance challenges. While there is a
growing recognition that we need to take and act on a longer-term view, the
incentives for myopic leadership and action remain acute. There is much aspira-
tional talk about social responsibility, social reporting, long-termism, and the
like, but implementation is nascent and sporadic. While temporal discounting
has long been known to matter in making individual choices, its nature and util-
ity in collective decision making remains poorly understood. Likewise, our abil-
ity to control activities with negative externalities has been limited by uncertainty
with respect to future costs and, more importantly, a lack of incentives to price
and allocate such costs equitably.
There is little question as to the trajectory of the law. By choice, by chance, or
by default, it is increasingly responding to diminished public trust in major in-
stitutions by imposing a standard of “reasonable expectations.”1 To the extent
that legislators are unable or unwilling to do so, our courts and adjudicative tri-
bunals have demonstrated a willingness to step in.
A case in point is with respect to the regulation of corporate conduct. Corporate
law is premised on the notion of limited liability conferred by statute—to facilitate
the mobilization of capital, shareholders are not held personally responsible for a
corporation’s liabilities. Over the past year, however, a series of decisions by var-
ious courts and regulatory bodies has responded to “reasonable expectations” by
circumscribing the scope of limited liability, holding parent corporations respon-
sible for the liabilities and misconduct of their subsidiaries.2 In these cases, the
public interest in discouraging excessive risk-taking and other harmful conduct
was found to outweigh the benefits of protecting shareholders from liability.
This article focuses on similar trends in the financial sector. The sector stands
out for scrutiny for a variety of reasons. For one, it continues to enjoy significant
public subsidies without a clear and current articulation of its social purpose and
responsibility.3 It may also be unique as a supply chain in which agents typically
1. See BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.).
2. See, e.g., Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013) (private equity company held liable for unfunded pension liabil-
ities of one of its portfolio companies under ERISA); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Asahi Tec Corp.,
No. 10-1936 (ABJ), 2013 WL 5503191 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2013) ( Japanese corporation held liable for
unfunded pension liabilities of its U.S. subsidiary under ERISA); Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., 2013
ONSC 1414, 116 O.R. (3d) 674 (Ont. Super. Ct. J.) (Ontario Superior Court of Justice refuses to
strike a claim against a Canadian mining corporation for human rights abuses alleged to have
been carried out by its subsidiary in Guatemala); Alcoa Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 71261,
2014 WL 69457 ( Jan. 9, 2014) (international aluminum producer charged under Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act for bribery carried out by its subsidiaries in Bahrain; agrees to pay $384 million in
fine). For a general discussion of some of the negative consequences of limited liability, see Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100
YALE L.J. 1879 (1980).
3. See ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON
FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES (2010). According to one recent study, for the
ten largest U.S. banks, “too big to fail” status means benefits equivalent to an $83 billion annual
subsidy from taxpayers. See Editorial, Why Should Taxpayers Give Big Banks $83 Billion a Year, BLOOM-
BERG VIEW (Feb. 20, 2013, 6:30 PM EST), http://goo.gl/E3GbJe.
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fare better than principals. In most other sectors, complexity has been harnessed
to benefit customers. In contrast, there is now widespread agreement that in-
creasing complexity in financial flows, instruments, and regulation has exacer-
bated informational asymmetries, eroded institutional cultures, and confounded
traditional regulatory frameworks—often to the detriment of consumers.4 For
example, while technological advances have radically reduced costs in other
trade sectors, the costs of financial intermediation have increased since the
mid-1970s and are higher now than they were at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury.5 Financial services lag other sectors by a generation in developing common
data standards.6
It should therefore come as no surprise that the financial sector attracts low
confidence—both within and without. For example, a recent survey of 250
U.S. financial services professionals revealed that most believe their competitors
engage in illegal or unethical activity in order to be successful.7 Moreover, not-
withstanding the proliferation of “ethics” courses in most MBA curricula, the pro-
blem is most acute amongst younger employees.8 Likewise, a recent survey by the
conservative American Enterprise Institute found a persistent lack of trust in Wall
Street five years after the financial crisis, suggesting deep public misgivings about
the operations of the financial sector.9 The consensus is that many firms are not
ethical or are not concerned about the well-being of the economy.
Without assigning blame, part of the story of the global financial crisis was
rooted in the bias to retrospection amongst regulators, policy makers, and aca-
demics—focusing on near-term data and clinging to the notion that markets
were perfectly efficient, despite a wealth of evidence to the contrary.10 Any sys-
tem built on a mismatch between expectations and actual outcomes is inevitably
4. See Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC Disclosure
Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 (2012); Sunita Sah, George Lowenstein & Daylian M. Cain, The Bur-
den of Disclosure: Increased Compliance with Distrusted Advice, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 289
(2013); Andrew G. Haldane & Vasileios Madouros, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City’s 36th Economic Policy Symposium: The Dog and the Frisbee (Aug. 31, 2012), available at
http://goo.gl/Mbn9mo; Luigi Zingales, Opinion, Why I Was Won Over by Glass-Steagall, FIN. TIMES,
June 11, 2012, at 11.
5. Thomas Philippon, Finance Versus Wal-Mart: Why Are Financial Services So Expensive?, in RE-
THINKING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 235, 239 (Alan S. Blinder, Robert M. Solow & Andrew W. Loh eds.,
2012).
6. Robleh D. Ali, Andrew G. Haldane & Paul Nahai-Williamson, Speech at the Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association Symposium on Building a Global Legal Entity Identifier Framework:
Towards a Common Financial Language 2 (Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.
uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech552.pdf (“Today’s financial chains mimic product
supply chains of the 1980s and the information chains of the 1990s.”).
7. LABATON SUCHAROW LLP, WALL STREET IN CRISIS: A PERFECT STORM LOOMING—LABATON SUCHAROW’S
U.S. FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY SURVEY 3 ( July 2013), available at http://www.secwhistlebloweradvo
cate.com/LiteratureRetrieve.aspx?ID=182189.
8. Id. at 5 (38 percent of survey respondents with less than ten years’ experience said they would
insider trade if they could get away with it).
9. See KARLYN BOWMAN & ANDREW RUGG, FIVE YEARS AFTER THE CRASH: WHAT AMERICANS THINK ABOUT
WALL STREET, BANKS, BUSINESS, AND FREE ENTERPRISE (2013), available at http://goo.gl/1ACZdq.
10. See JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION MAKING: FINAL RE-
PORT ¶¶ 4.1–4.19 (2012); see also Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of In-
formationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
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going to be prone to crisis. Arguably, notwithstanding reams of additional reg-
ulation, that risk is as acute today as it was a decade ago. The view that another
financial crisis is inevitable and imminent casts a long shadow.11
Rules, institutions, and cultures that reward those who take advantage of in-
formational asymmetries or succumb to a self-destructive cycle of short-termism
have generated unhealthy outcomes for the system. Financial services are critical
to ensuring future well-being. We need a financial system that reflects the diver-
sity of human motives and allows people to enter into complex and incentivizing
transactions to further their goals—a system that channels the human impulse
toward competition and conflict into a manageable arena that is both peaceful
and constructive.12 To do so, the financial services sector must have broad regard
for the systemic effects of its actions. It must focus on how investment can create
better markets tomorrow, rather than simply “beating” the market today.
We argue that our courts and regulators are looking for opportunities to better
define and protect the public interest. This trend is likely to lead to the imposi-
tion of public stewardship responsibilities throughout the financial services sup-
ply chain. We argue that the financial services sector, rather than waiting for this
trend to develop and reacting to new rules in a piecemeal fashion, should be
proactive and try to shape the way in which this trend develops.
We will develop this argument as follows. First, we provide a number of recent
reference points, designed to illustrate the trajectory of the law and the increasing
velocity and intensity of regulatory reform. We then review the dynamic evolu-
tion of fiduciary standards in the financial services sector—which, we suggest,
provides a conceptual and normative context for much of these reform initiatives.
We conclude by outlining likely areas for financial sector reform and suggesting
ways the sector itself (and those who rely on it for the efficient mobilization and
allocation of capital) might proactively shape the trajectory of the law.
A PENDING INFLECTION POINT
It is difficult to read the business section of any major newspaper without find-
ing at least one article pointing to how the financial services sector has become
disconnected from the needs of the “real economy.” Before considering how a dy-
namic re-framing of fiduciary obligations is likely to motivate a re-imagining of
the social utility of financial services, it may be helpful to highlight a few recent
examples of dysfunction, and consequential regulatory responses, which suggest
the likelihood that we have reached an inflection point. In none of these exam-
ples are the highest echelons of the institutions under scrutiny clearly implicated
in any wrongdoing. In some examples, the behavior these institutions engaged in
may not even have been technically illegal. What went wrong, rather, was that
these institutions focused on doing things right—i.e., in technical compliance
with whatever legal rules existed at the time—rather than doing the right thing.
11. Over half of the CFA Institute members predict a financial bubble in their home markets in the
coming year. See CFA INST., GLOBAL MARKET SENTIMENT SURVEY 142 (2014).
12. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, FINANCE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 228–29 (2012).
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They engaged in conduct that was legal but unfair to market participants, or they
instituted compliance controls that may have appeared adequate in light of what
peer firms were doing but that ultimately failed to prevent improper activity by
employees. We argue that regulatory reactions to this conduct—increasingly pu-
nitive sanctions, justified on the basis of market fairness—should lead institu-
tions to rethink their assumptions about the public purpose of the financial sec-
tor and how best to respond to rising public expectations.
As this article is being written, regulators in several jurisdictions are investigat-
ing alleged manipulation of the $5.3 trillion-a-day foreign exchange market.13
The allegations involve collusion among traders to fix benchmark exchange
rates in their favor, resulting in higher costs for consumers (including pension
funds, mutual funds, and multinational corporations that routinely trade in ex-
change rates). In a market this large, even a scheme that skims fractional
amounts translates into billions of dollars. Since traders’ bonuses are based on
trading profits, they have ample reason to collude and manipulate, especially
in the absence of transparent markets or strong oversight. Remarkably, in
2012 the Obama administration added to the opacity of foreign exchange mar-
kets when it exempted certain foreign exchange derivatives from the application
of new rules under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”).14
Significant fines and penalties are likely inevitable, given regulators’ responses
to other recently uncovered misconduct. For instance, since 2009, the seven lar-
gest U.S. banks have paid out or set aside more than $45 billion for mortgage
misrepresentation issues (and incurred roughly $5 billion in combined legal ex-
penses).15 Standard & Poor’s estimates that these banks may need to pay out
an additional $55–$105 billion to settle mortgage-related issues.16 In 2013
alone, JPMorgan paid out regulatory penalties of $20 billion on matters ranging
from mortgage misrepresentations to failing to report Bernard Madoff ’s suspi-
cious activities to the authorities.17 Many believe the institution, and others
like it, have become so large and complex that it may be impossible to keep em-
ployees in line—“there is too much of an incentive for an individual to cut
corners.”18
The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (the
“Card Act”)19 is an example of legislative efforts to remedy conduct that, while
not illegal, was perceived as being unfair to consumers. The Card Act was en-
acted in response to a perception that banks were gaming consumers on fees
for late payments or for borrowing more than their credit limit (e.g., by raising
13. Editorial, Another Banking Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013, at A28.
14. Determination of Foreign Exchange Swaps and Foreign Exchange Forwards Under the Com-
modity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 69694 (Nov. 20, 2012).
15. The Largest U.S. Banks Should Be Able to Withstand The Ramifications of Legal Issues, STANDARD &
POOR’S RATING SERVICES, 2 (Nov. 25, 2013), available at http://goo.gl/lG8vvr.
16. Id.
17. Peter Eavis, Steep Penalties Taken in Stride by JPMorgan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2014, at A1.
18. Id. (quoting Paul Miller, bank analyst at FBR Capital Markets).
19. Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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these fees without notice and without giving reasons).20 It imposes a series of
restrictions on banks’ behavior: among other things, it imposes limits on the
number and types of charges banks can impose and requires banks to give cus-
tomers twenty-one days’ notice of monthly bills and forty-five days’ notice of
any increase in interest rates.21 The Card Act has proven effective—a recent
study found that, on average, the new law saved consumers an annualized 1.7
percent of the average daily balance on their cards—a staggering $12.6 billion
per year.22
High-frequency trading, particularly the early release of market informa-
tion to high-frequency traders, is another area where we can expect new rules
to emerge. In July 2013, Thomson Reuters suspended the practice of selling
market-moving data (a consumer confidence index) to high-frequency algorith-
mic traders up to two seconds ahead of making it available to other subscribers.
This was in response to an investigation launched by the New York State Attor-
ney General’s office which, apparently, took up the matter after a whistleblower
complaint had been filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.23
There was no allegation of conventional illegality. Indeed, Thomson Reuters
insisted that it had the right to “legally distribute non-governmental data” to
“fee-paying subscribers.”24
Illustrating the potential value of “latency” (i.e., the time it takes for a stock
quote to get from an exchange’s server to a trader’s screen) in high-frequency
trading, one study estimated that a high-frequency trader could theoretically gen-
erate just over $32,000 by trading for one day in Apple stock, simply by picking
off quotes on various exchanges that were fractions of a second out of date.25 Ex-
trapolating that number to reflect the thousands of stocks trading electronically
suggests that billions of dollars are being skimmed from the market.26 Stock ex-
changes not only encourage, but profit from, this activity. Many exchanges are
“landlords”—allowing high-frequency traders to place their trading computers
near the exchange’s servers to access prices a few milliseconds ahead of other tra-
ders (a service called “co-location”). What is more, regulation may have contrib-
uted to the problem—Regulation NMS, which requires brokers to execute trades
20. See Floyd Norris, Card Act Cleared Up Credit Cards’ Hidden Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2013, at B1.
21. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666(a), 1637(o)(1), 1637(i)(1), 1693(a), 1637( j)–(l) (2012).
22. Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Neale Mahoney & Johannes Stroebel, Regulating
Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from Credit Cards 3 (Apr. 2014) (unpublished manuscript
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330942).
23. Matt Taibbi, Sixteen Major Firms May Have Received Early Data from Thomson Reuters, ROLLING
STONE POL. (Sept. 5, 2013, 2:25 PM EST), http://goo.gl/xhGL64.
24. Id. More recently, Berkshire Hathaway’s Business Wire reported that Berkshire Hathaway has
decided to stop giving high-speed traders direct access to news releases, after consultations with the
New York Attorney General’s office. See Scott Patterson, Traders’ Access to Releases Curbed, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 21, 2014, at C1.
25. Shengwei Ding, John Hanna & Terrence Hendershott, How Slow Is the NBBO? A Comparison
with Direct Exchange Feeds, 49 FIN. REV. 313, 323 (2014).
26. See Eric T. Schneiderman, Address at New York Law School: High-Frequency Trading & In-
sider Trading 2.0, at 5 (Mar. 18, 2014), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/HFT_and_market_
structure.pdf.
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at the “best price available,” has been widely blamed for helping spur an “arms
race” on the part of traders to get prices and other information faster.27
Recent settlements reached between prosecutors and major financial institu-
tions show that the early release of market-moving information is not a problem
limited to the high-frequency trading arena. A few months after the Thomson
Reuters issue surfaced, Citigroup announced it was paying a $30 million fine
to Massachusetts to settle charges that one of its analysts offered unpublished re-
search related to orders for Apple iPhones to selected clients. Citigroup also
agreed to undertake a three-year review of its policies and procedures. The fine
came nearly a year after Citigroup paid Massachusetts $2 million to settle charges
that two other analysts shared non-public information about Facebook.28
Like Thomson Reuters, BlackRock, the world’s largest asset management com-
pany, recently entered into a settlement with the New York Attorney General. It
agreed to end its practice of surveying Wall Street analysts to glean advance in-
formation prior to public dissemination of their research reports. Attorney Gen-
eral Eric T. Schneiderman called BlackRock’s decision to end this practice “a
major step forward in restoring fairness in our financial markets and ensuring
a level playing field for all investors.”29
British regulators recently called attention to unethical conduct by auditors and
pension trustees. In September 2013, the U.K. Financial Reporting Council in-
voked new sanction powers to issue a “severe reprimand” and a £14 million
fine against Deloitte for “placing their own interests ahead of the public” and com-
promising their own objectivity “in flagrant disregard of the professional stan-
dards expected and required.”30 While the ethics rules of the U.K. professional
accounting body require accountants to consider the public interest, the tradi-
tional view was that this only applied in respect of audit mandates.31 The tribu-
nal, however, concluded that this duty applied to “all assignments and appoint-
ments” undertaken by an audit firm.32
27. The regulation is now under review by the SEC. See Jacob Bunge, A Suspect Emerges in Stock-
Trade Hiccups: Regulation NMS, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2014, at A1; Steven M. Davidoff, S.E.C.’s Review of
Trading Will See Some of Its Own Work, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2014, at B5.
28. Alexandra Stevenson & Ben Protess, SAC’s Forceful Ways Shown in Massachusetts Citi Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2013, at B1.
29. Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., New York State Attorney General A.G.
Schneiderman Announces Agreement with BlackRock to End Its Analyst Survey Program Worldwide
( Jan. 9, 2014), available at http://goo.gl/FBR7oI; see also Gretchen Morgenson, BlackRock Agrees to
Stop Pursuing Nonpublic Views, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2014, at B1.
30. Deloitte & Touche LLP, Report of the Tribunal ¶¶ 200, 270 (F.R.C. Sept. 9, 2013) [herein-
after Financial Reporting Council Tribunal Report], available at http://goo.gl/SDjTLM. The case arose
out of corporate finance advice provided by Deloitte on the sale of MG Rover. The Financial Report-
ing Council found that Deloitte had failed to manage conflicts of interest arising from the dual role it
took on as auditor to MG Rover and advisor to a group of directors who sought to buy the company.
The directors succeeded in buying the company in 2000, but the company collapsed in 2005.
31. See INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG. AND WALES CODE OF ETHICS ¶¶ 1.2, 100.1 (as
amended Jan. 1, 2013); Unintended Consequences of MG Rover, ECONOMIA (Sept. 13, 2013), http://
economia.icaew.com/opinion/september-2013/unintended-consequences-of-mg.
32. Financial Reporting Council Tribunal Report, supra note 30, ¶ 42.
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In the same month, the U.K. Office of Fair Trading raised concerns about a
number of older defined contribution pension plans, in which as many as
190,000 savers were thought to be paying 1 percent or more in annual charges
(as opposed to the “new wave” of defined contribution plans, where charges tend
to be half that amount).33 The life-cycle effect of a 1 percent annual charge can
reduce retirement savings by approximately 21 percent.34 The study estimated
that approximately £30 billion is tied up in these old plans.35 The study also
highlighted the lack of trustee competence and poor governance in 3,000 smaller
pension schemes worth about £10 billion.36 In response to the study, the Asso-
ciation of British Insurers (the “ABI”) agreed to conduct an audit of the older
plans.37 The ABI has also launched a public review of retirement income
needs and the manner and extent to which the current system meets them.38
It would not be surprising if regulators soon begin focusing their attention
on the quality of the advice investment consultants give in exchange for the
fees they charge. A recent study by three professors at Oxford University’s
Saı¨d Business School found no evidence that the recommendations of investment
consultants for U.S. equities helped investors to outperform their benchmarks or
generate alpha (excess risk adjusted returns).39 Rather, on average, products re-
commended by consultants underperformed non-recommended products by
about 1 percent per year.40 Leaving aside the fees paid to such consultants (in
2012, CalPERS paid $33 million in such fees), such underperformance repre-
sents billions of dollars of lost value to current and future pensioners.41
While the foregoing discussion addresses action taken (or likely to be taken) by
a wide range of regulators addressing diverse areas of the financial sector, the pro-
blems identified share common characteristics. First, in many instances those in-
volved focused on compliance with rules rather than principles. There was no
prohibition on Thomson Reuters selling advance access to market-moving data,
nor is it illegal for high-frequency traders to generate returns through latency ar-
bitrage. There is no rule that would prohibit the high fees identified in the Office
of Fair Trading report or on charging for investment advice that ultimately fails to
generate returns for clients. Deloitte did not believe it was under a duty to serve
the public interest when it was acting outside of its capacity as an auditor.
Though the institutions implicated in the mortgage misrepresentation and foreign
33. Josephine Cumbo, OFT Stops Short of a Fees Cap, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2013, at 3; OFFICE OF FAIR
TRADING, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION WORKPLACE PENSION MARKET STUDY ¶¶ 6.42–6.51, 9.58 (2013) [herein-
after OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING STUDY], available at http://goo.gl/Y6JfsD.
34. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING STUDY, supra note 33, ¶ 6.1.
35. Id. ¶¶ 6.1, 6.42.
36. Id. ¶ 9.25.
37. Id. ¶ 9.22.
38. See ASS’N OF BRITISH INSURERS, A NEW RETIREMENT—CALL FOR EVIDENCE (Nov. 18, 2013), available at
https://www.abi.org.uk/Insurance-and-savings/Topics-and-issues/A-new-retirement/Call-for-evidence.
39. See Howard Johns, Tim Jenkinson & Jose Vicenti Martinez, Picking Winners? Investment Con-
sultants’ Recommendations of Fund Managers ( June 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2327042).
40. Id. at 6.
41. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Doubts Raised on Advice Pensions Get, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2013, at B1.
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exchange market manipulation scandals almost certainly had formal compliance
controls in place, they plainly did not do enough to ensure that these controls
worked in practice. By apparently aiming only to do enough to avoid a technical
violation of the law as they understood it to be at the time, rather than fully con-
sidering the long-term consequences their actions could have for themselves and
third parties, these institutions invited scrutiny and penalties from regulators.
Second, in many of these cases it is arguable that regulation contributed to the
problem. By focusing on enforcement over prevention, increased regulation has
tended to push financial institutions into a defensive posture—thinking about
how to defend themselves in court rather than how to do the right thing. It
has also fostered increased gaming by market participants, as the case of Regula-
tion NMS illustrates. Other rules, discussed in the next part of this article, have
encouraged investors to engage in herding into particular investments, leading to
dangerous levels of risk in the financial system.42 These are examples of how
market and regulatory imperfections can interact in powerful and often destruc-
tive ways. As Robert Shiller astutely observes, “[d]esigning financial institutions
around the imperfections of regulators—as much as that can be done—is as im-
portant as designing financial institutions around the imperfections of market
participants.”43
It is clear that “doing it right” is no longer enough. Regulators, courts, and leg-
islators that find examples of conduct that is not in line with “reasonable
expectations” or that appears to be unfair will intervene, often with punitive sanc-
tions. The question is whether there is a way of understanding this pattern, pre-
dicting its future course, and prescribing conduct that avoids further sanctions.
The next parts of this article argue that fiduciary law offers an answer to this
question. It discusses the purpose fiduciary law is intended to serve, along with
the way in which this area of the law has developed in respect of financial ser-
vices. It argues that interventions by courts, regulators, and legislators can be un-
derstood as attempts to give life to a broad conception of fiduciary duty that re-
cognizes the social function that financial services serve.
FIDUCIARY SOCIETY: EVOLVING STANDARDS IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
The body of human knowledge and understanding continues to grow exponen-
tially. We are overwhelmed by information. No individual is capable of processing
all of this information alone, let alone using it to make intelligent decisions in
everyday life. By necessity, individual knowledge and expertise have become
more specialized. As a result, we rely on specialists—in finance, medicine, law,
financial services, and other disciplines—to help us take advantage of advances
in human understanding. This combination of specialization and interdepen-
dence is essential to human progress. It fosters both the development of new
42. See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
43. SHILLER, supra note 12, at 184–85.
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knowledge and the use of this knowledge to help us make better decisions and
achieve better outcomes.44
But this combination is not sufficient. The traditional tools for supervising
counterparties, available through the law of contract, cannot guarantee the effec-
tive delivery of specialized services. Individuals simply do not have the resources
or the expertise to determine on their own whether these specialized services are
actually serving their interests. Instead, these individuals need to trust that the
specialists they rely upon will keep their best interests at heart.45
Fiduciary law aims to promote this trust.46 It applies to relationships in which
one party, the fiduciary, gains discretionary power over another party, the bene-
ficiary, in circumstances where both parties would “reasonably expect” that the
fiduciary will exercise this power in the best interests of the beneficiary.47 It im-
poses a standard of conduct higher than that normally found in the marketplace.
It subjects the fiduciary to well-established duties of loyalty, obedience, and
care.48 In combination, they oblige the fiduciary to act prudently in the best in-
terests of the beneficiary.49
These duties are not a rigid code that can be addressed through “check box”
compliance. Rather, they are open-ended and contextual, prescribing broad
principles whose content can vary depending on the circumstances and that
44. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 802–03 (1983) [hereinafter Frankel,
Fiduciary Law]; see also Alison G. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 739–40, 747, 794 (1977); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the
Twenty-First Century, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1289, 1292 (2011); James E. Post, Governance, Accountability,
and Trust: A Comment on the Work of Tamar Frankel, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1173 (2011); Ernest J.
Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 11 (1976).
45. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 44, at 800, 803, 810, 812–14.
46. See Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 310 (1989); Law-
rence E. Mitchell, The Naked Emperor: A Corporate Lawyer Looks at RUPA’s Fiduciary Provisions, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465, 480 (1997).
47. Historically, fiduciary duties only applied to lawyers, partners, corporate directors, and trus-
tees. The Supreme Court of Canada has led the common law world in adopting the more principled
approach to defining fiduciary duties. Other jurisdictions later followed this court’s lead. See Guerin v.
The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 384 (Can.); Bristol & West Building Soc’y v. Mothew, [1996] 4 All
E.R. 698 (Eng. Ct. App.); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991). The circum-
stances in which a reasonable expectation that one party will act in the best interests of the other
will arise varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The most common circumstances where this reason-
able expectation arises are where such an undertaking is imposed by statute or by agreement; it
can also arise where one party seeks advice from another party on a highly specialized field (e.g.,
law or medicine) in which the latter party has expertise. See Galambos v. Perez, 2009 SCC 48,
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 247, ¶ 84 (Can.).
48. Though there has been some debate over whether the duty of care can be properly described
as a “fiduciary” duty (as opposed to simply a tort or contractual duty), both Canada and the United
States have recognized fiduciary duties of care, and the rest of the common law world appears to be
moving in this direction. See Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law’s “Holy Grail”: Reconciling Theory and
Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REV. 921, 959 (2011); Edward J. Waitzer & Douglas
Sarro, The Public Fiduciary: Emerging Themes in Canadian Fiduciary Law for Pension Trustees, 91
CAN. BAR REV. 163, 178–79 (2012); Futter v. Futter, [2011] EWCA Civ 197, ¶ 127 (Eng. Ct.
App.) (recognizing that “trustees’ duty to take relevant matters into account [in carrying out their re-
sponsibilities] is a fiduciary duty”); see also J.D. Heydon, Are the Duties of Company Directors to Ex-
ercise Care and Skill Fiduciary?, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW 185 (Simone Degeling & James Edelman
eds., 2005); Paul Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 283 (2011).
49. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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can evolve over time. As a result, fiduciary law effectively places the onus on fi-
duciaries to reflect on their legal relationships and consider how to act in accor-
dance with these duties. Fiduciaries that ignore this onus risk having standards
of appropriate conduct articulated for them after the fact.
The social importance of fiduciary services, and hence fiduciary duties, has
risen considerably over the past several decades. In 1983 Tamar Frankel
noted that the United States was undergoing a transition from being a “contract
society” (which values economic independence) to a “fiduciary society” (which
values interdependence).50 The recent financial crisis highlighted how interde-
pendent the world has become, and how reliant we have all become on a
sound financial sector—our fiduciary society has gone global.
Developments in the financial sector offer insight not only into the importance
of fiduciary law but into its characteristics. For instance, nowhere is the flexibil-
ity of the duties of loyalty and care better illustrated than in the development of
fiduciary duties as they have applied to financial services.
A. THE DUTY OF CARE
The duty of care requires a fiduciary to exercise its powers as a prudent person
would in the circumstances.51 The definition of “prudence” with respect to the
delivery of financial services has changed dramatically as our understanding of
investment risk has developed.
Financial crises have played an important role in its development. In 1719,
the British Parliament authorized trustees to invest in the South Sea Company.52
While Parliament thought that it was giving trustees and beneficiaries a chance to
participate in the massive surge in the value of South Sea stock, this surge turned
out to be a bubble. The following year, share prices fell by over 90 percent.53
The English courts of equity reacted by redefining the meaning of prudence
by adopting the “legal list” approach, whereby a prescribed list of “safe” invest-
ments (particularly government bonds and, later on, first mortgages) were pre-
sumptively viewed as prudent, while all other investments (particularly equities)
were presumed to be imprudent.54
In the United States, the Massachusetts courts adopted a more flexible ap-
proach, holding in the 1830 case Harvard College v. Amory that the prudent per-
son rule simply required trustees to avoid “speculation” and to select investments
by “considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital
to be invested.”55 New York, however, imported the legal list approach into
50. Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 44, at 802.
51. See Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 406, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645 (Ch. 1742); In re Speight,
22 Ch.D. 727, 739 (1883) (Eng. Ct. App.); see also Marcia M. McMurray, A Historical Perspective on the
Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1987).
52. 6 Geo. 1, c. 4, s. 23 (1719) (U.K.).
53. John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 641, 643 (1996).
54. See id. at 643; GEORGE KEETON, MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TRUSTS 46–62 (1971).
55. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
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American law in the 1869 case King v. Talbot.56 Most states adopted the New
York approach, either through legislation or through common law.57
Legislatures and courts gradually expanded legal lists, eventually embracing
some investment in equities. Though many trustees managed to structure the
terms of their trusts so as to allow for a more flexible approach to investment,
courts interpreted these terms restrictively. Overall, a highly conservative ap-
proach to investment persisted in the common law world well into the twentieth
century.58
Over time, the market environment made this approach impractical. The
“safe” fixed income investments prescribed by the courts left investors vulnerable
to inflation risk—a risk that became particularly salient with the hyperinflation
of the period immediately following the Second World War. Trustees also
learned that, over the long run, equities and foreign securities outperformed
the “legal list” investments. Modern Portfolio Theory offered a new approach
to assessing investment risk. It held that, rather than weighing the risk of a port-
folio by looking at each individual investment in isolation, investors should
weigh risk by looking at the portfolio as a whole. In other words, it was pru-
dent—and generally beneficial—for investors to give some weight in their port-
folio to high-risk investments (and thus achieve some exposure to the high re-
turns these investments offered), provided these investments did not receive
undue weight within the portfolio.
This enhanced understanding of prudent investing came to be reflected in leg-
islation: the Uniform Prudent Investor Act in the United States (which was devel-
oped by the American Law Institute and has been adopted in most states), the
Pensions Act 1995 in the United Kingdom, and various provincial trust statutes
in Canada.59 This legislation recast the prudent person rule as the “prudent inves-
tor” rule. Under this rule, no particular investment is per se off limits; rather, trus-
tees are required to consider the portfolio as a whole and to ensure that the port-
folio is appropriate for the investor, in that it is designed to generate a suitable
rate of return without creating an undue risk of loss. Legislators also recognized
that the growing complexity of financial markets made it practically impossible
for trustees to manage a portfolio on their own. As such, these rules permitted
the delegation of responsibility for investment management to third parties.
This approach produced its own perverse effects. Trustees concluded that they
could avoid liability under this approach by adopting two strategies. First, they
took pains to avoid “underperforming” the market in the short term, relying on
56. 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
57. See W. Brantley Phillips, Jr., Chasing Down the Devil: Standards of Prudent Investment Under the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 335, 341 (1997).
58. See John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust Investment Law, 1976 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 5–6; Langbein, supra note 53, at 645.
59. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, §§ 2(b), (f ), 7B U.L.A. 20 (2006); Pensions Act, 1995, c. 26, ss. 33
(1), 35, 36(2) (U.K.); Trustee Act R.S.O. 1990, c. T.23, s. 27(1) (Can.), amended by S.O. 1998, c. 18,
sched. B, s. 16(1); Trustee Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 464, ss. 15.1–15.6 (Can.), amended by S.B.C. 2002,
c. 33, s. 23; Trustee Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 479, ss. 3A–3F (Can.), amended by S.N.S. 2002, c. 10, s. 45;
Trustee Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. T-8, ss. 2–3.5 (Can.), amended by S.P.E.I. 1997, c. 51, s. 1.
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the assumption that price is always the best guide to value and that those who
fell behind the market, even on a quarterly basis, could face liability for failing
to generate appropriate returns. Second, in part to mitigate their liability expo-
sure, they took full advantage of the delegation rule, relying heavily on an
ever-expanding chain of advisers, managers, and consultants.60
These strategies fostered a herding mentality, whereby trustees, along with the
interconnected web of actors that trustees delegated authority to, all too often
acted as closet indexers, “trading in and out of the same stocks frequently to
show activity, but overall just following the index to avoid any years of signifi-
cant underperformance.”61 This means crowding into investments fueled by “ir-
rational exuberance” rather than real value, only to exit these investments the
minute portfolio performance began to fall. While this dynamic of “perpetual in-
vestors making short-term investments forever”62 might help trustees avoid scru-
tiny on a quarterly basis, on a long-term basis it all too often means that trustees
are “buying high and selling low.”63
This sort of short-termism, encouraged by regulatory frameworks, has impli-
cations that reach beyond any particular fund. It creates volatility,64 destroys
long-term value, makes markets less efficient, and impedes efforts to improve
corporate governance by misaligning asset owner and investor goals.65 It also
ignores the arbitrage opportunities available to those with a longer investment
horizon.66
It is now broadly accepted that most investment returns come from general
exposure to the market (beta) rather than from seeking market benchmark out-
performance strategies (alpha).67 As a result, systemic market factors have be-
come critical to fiduciary responsibility. Investments are increasingly expected
to look past current market benchmarks and consider questions of future
value—to “assess the impact of their investment decisions on others including
60. See James Hawley, Keith Johnson & Ed Waitzer, Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty Balance, ROTMAN J.
INT’L PENSION MGMT., Fall 2011, at 4, 9; Fiona Stewart & Pablo Antolin, Supervisory Oversight of Pension
Fund Governance (Int’l Org. of Pension Supervisors Working Paper No. 9, 2008), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809823.
61. Dominic Barton & Mark Wiseman, Address to the Institute of Corporate Directors in Toronto,
Canada: Focusing Capital on the Long Term 4 (May 22, 2013), available at http://goo.gl/3dVj7S.
62. SIMON ZADEK, MIRA MERME & RICHARD SAMANS, MAINSTREAMING RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 19 (2005),
available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/mri/pdf (quoting a comment by Simon Zadek in his presen-
tation at the International Corporate Governance Network’s July 2004 Annual Conference in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil).
63. David F. Swensen, The Mutual Fund Merry-Go-Round, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2011, at SR6; see
also Paul Woolley, Written Evidence Submitted to the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee,
U.K. House of Commons (Feb. 25, 2013), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201314/cmselect/cmbis/603/603we26.htm.
64. See Hawley, Johnson & Waitzer, supra note 60, at 7.
65. CFA CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY & BUS. ROUNDTABLE INST. FOR CORPORATE ETHICS, BREAKING THE
SHORT-TERM CYCLE 4 (2006) [hereinafter BREAKING THE SHORT-TERM CYCLE].
66. See Michael W. Roherge, Joseph C. Flaherty, Jr., Robert M. Almeida, Jr. & Andrew L. Boyd,
Lengthening the Investment Time Horizon 2 (MFS White Paper Series, May 2014), available at http://goo.
gl/26urJ5.
67. See Roger Ibbotson, The Importance of Asset Allocation, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.–Apr. 2010, at 18,
20.
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generations to come.”68 Risk management means considering such factors as
market integrity, systemic risks, governance risks, advisor risks, and the like.
There is also a growing recognition that asset classes of longer duration often
yield the highest private (as well as societal) returns.69
Yet the mismatch between heightened expectations and suboptimal results
persists. One of the likely reasons for this is that so many players in the invest-
ment chain benefit from the status quo. Managers of actively managed funds col-
lect high fees in return for their promise to help investors beat the market, even
when they consistently fail to deliver.70 Financial advisors and brokers receive
incentives from third parties to recommend high-cost investment strategies to
their clients based on short-term performance metrics.71 The financial sector
continues to be an environment where the “food chain operates in reverse,
with service providers at the top and clients at the bottom.”72
Tolerance for this dynamic is waning. In a sense, we have drifted away from
the most fundamental meaning of fiduciary duty, which is to preserve the assets
entrusted to the fiduciary.73 Harvard College v. Amory says nothing about match-
ing or beating benchmarks—that is a recent concept. If one thinks of preserving
assets as meaning to protect them from inflation, it is but a small step to include
protecting them from a degenerating environment and society. In formulating
new norms to govern the financial sector, legislators, regulators, and courts
are increasingly relying on this view of investor “prudence” which is enhanced
by a renewed focus on the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which we now address.
B. THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
The duty of loyalty—to act in the best interests of beneficiaries—has long been
recognized as the “cardinal duty” in the fiduciary relationship,74 such that, where
a conflict arises between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, the conflict
must be resolved in favor of the duty of loyalty.75 This duty has historically
been described narrowly, as implying only a duty to avoid conflicts of interest
or to disclose such conflicts to the beneficiaries.76 It has also been argued, how-
ever, that this duty is best framed as a broad, positive duty to “actively pursue”
68. Steve Lydenberg, Reason, Rationality and Fiduciary Duty, 119 J. BUS. ETHICS 365, 375 (2014).
69. See Andrew Haldane & Richard Davies, The Short Long: Presentation Before the Socie´te´ Uni-
versitaire Europe´ene de Recherches Finanacie`res Colloquium: New Paradigms in Money and Fi-
nance? 14 (May 2011), available at http://goo.gl/Dn6K85.
70. Burton G. Malkiel, Asset Management Fees and the Growth of Finance, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 105
(2013).
71. FINRA, REPORT ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 10, 39 (2013), available at http://goo.gl/YOwSqC.
72. AMIN RAJAN, DB & DC PLANS: STRENGTHENING THEIR DELIVERY 22 (2008).
73. See supra note 54.
74. Paul Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 270 (2011).
75. Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 125
(2004).
76. See, e.g., Breen v. Williams (1996), 186 C.L.R. 71 (Austl.); Pilmer v. Duke Group (in liq.),
[2001] HCA 31, 207 C.L.R. 165 (Austl.); Pamela F. Hanrahan, The Fiduciary Idea in Financial Services
Law, in INTEGRITY, RISK AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN CAPITAL MARKETS: REGULATING CULTURE 203, 214–16 ( Justin
O’Brien & George Gilligan eds., 2013).
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the best interests of beneficiaries.77 Under this view, the duty of care is best
viewed as a component of the duty of loyalty, and as a result should be inter-
preted in light of this overarching duty.
The narrower view of the duty of loyalty is incapable of achieving fiduciary
law’s goal of encouraging trust in specialized service providers. Disclosure has
been shown to be an imperfect tool for managing conflicts,78 and while the
avoidance of conflicts is a necessary step toward reinforcing trust in financial
markets, it is not sufficient. It is also necessary to take into account the perni-
cious effects of short-termism, highlighted above. Regulators and courts have in-
creasingly taken notice of this narrower view.79 As a result, for fiduciaries to ac-
curately predict and respond to the course of future regulation, they will need to
look to the broader account of the duty of loyalty.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on the duty of loyalty offers a
perspective of how this view works in practice. In BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debenture-
holders,80 the Court reviewed a claim by bondholders who alleged that the
board of BCE Inc. had not adequately considered their interests before agreeing
to a change-of-control transaction. The Court, in upholding the board’s decision,
held that, in executing its duty of loyalty to the corporation, the board was re-
quired to reflect on the interests of the corporation both as an economic actor
and as a “good corporate citizen.”81 The Court added that, in doing so, it was
legitimate for directors to consider not only the interests of shareholders and
creditors, but also broader social interests, including those of the environment.82
In other words, it was not enough for the board to avoid conflicts of interest—
it had to actively exercise its powers in the best interests of its beneficiary, the
corporation, viewed both as an economic actor and as a responsible citizen. In
77. Hanrahan, supra note 76, at 220; see also Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good
Faith and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 855 (2007).
78. Compare Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on Coming Clean:
Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005) (which concludes that con-
sumers often ignore disclosure of conflicts of interest, or insufficiently discount them), with Sunita
Sah & George Loewenstein, Nothing to Declare: Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosure Leads Advisors
to Avoid Conflicts of Interest, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 575 (2014) (which suggests that disclosure requirements
may help reduce the number of avoidable conflicts of interest, particularly if service providers are
motivated to develop and maintain a reputation for ethical behavior). The link Sah & Lowenstein
draw between reputational concerns and the effectiveness of disclosure provides further support
for the proposition that a change in culture within the financial sector will lead to better outcomes
for consumers.
79. See Financial Reporting Council Tribunal Report, supra note 30, ¶¶ 35–36 (noting that audi-
tors “should strive for objectivity in all professional and business judgments” and should consider
“the public interest and its bearing on the work [they are offered]”); CDX Liquidating Trust v. Ven-
rock Assocs., 640 F.3d 209, 218–19 (7th Cir. 2011) (concluding that, under Delaware law, disclo-
sure of a conflict of interest will not immunize that director from a claim for breach of fiduciary duty;
implicit in this conclusion is the understanding that disclosure of a conflict of interest by a fiduciary
does not necessarily protect a beneficiary from self-interested behavior by that fiduciary); In re Rural
Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 80 (Del. Ch. 2014) (noting that corporate directors, as
fiduciaries, are required to “act prudently, loyally, and in good faith to maximize [the company]’s
value over the long-term for the benefit of its stockholders”).
80. 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.).
81. Id. ¶ 66.
82. Id. ¶ 40.
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practice, we suggest this means that fiduciaries must exercise their powers in ac-
cordance with the law and must generally avoid conduct that is unethical or that
otherwise does not reflect prevailing social norms.83 When a fiduciary invests on
behalf of, or provides advice to, a client, that fiduciary must treat that client (and
everyone who invests or otherwise has an interest in that client) fairly and equi-
tably. This “duty of impartiality” requires fiduciaries to consider and balance the
divergent interests of these beneficiaries.84 Fiduciaries charged with managing
and advising investment vehicles that encompass multiple generations of bene-
ficiaries, like pension plans, must therefore consider the intergenerational impli-
cations of their decisions (or advice).85 This, in effect, imports the principle of
intergenerational equity into the duty of loyalty.86
Guidance can also be found in the definition of the duty of loyalty adopted in
the American “public trust doctrine.” This doctrine starts from the premise that
social and economic progress depend on a common infrastructure—and that, as
such, the preservation of this infrastructure for future generations is a vital public
goal. The public trust doctrine has aimed to achieve this goal by imposing on
government a duty to preserve natural resources for the use and enjoyment of
future generations. While the present generation is entitled to reasonable use
of these resources, any use that interferes with the rights of future generations
is prohibited.87
The principles underlying the public trust doctrine are easily translated to the
financial world. Investors rely on a common infrastructure: stock markets that
should offer investors fair and equitable access to the capital markets; investment
managers, consultants, and advisers who should be trusted to act in the best in-
terests of their clients; companies that should adhere to sound corporate govern-
ance principles that foster long-term growth; and a sustainable natural environ-
ment capable of facilitating further human progress. If this infrastructure is
allowed to fail, all investors, present and future, will lose. The duty of loyalty,
as it is increasingly envisioned by courts, regulators, and legislators, imposes
a similar resulting obligation on financial actors to preserve and continue to
83. Attempting to define “prevailing social norms” will always be a challenge. Consultation with an
institution’s stakeholders is one means of ascertaining prevailing social norms; many authors have sug-
gested additional means by which an institution can address this challenge, including by looking to
scientific evidence and transnational standards that emerge from broad and meaningful dialogue. See
Steve Lydenberg, Ethics, Politics, Sustainability and the 21st Century Trustee, in SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVEST-
MENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DOES IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE FOR SOCIETY? 197 (Celine Louche & Tessa Hebb eds.,
2014).
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (2007); Edge v. Pensions Ombudsman, [1998] Ch. 512,
aff ’d, [1999] EWCA Civ 2013, 4 All E.R. 546 (Eng. Ct. App.).
85. See Withers v. Teacher’s Ret. Sys. of N.Y.C., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1257–58 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see
also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
86. See, e.g., Bennett v. British Columbia, 2009 BCSC 1358, 77 C.C.P.B. 56 (B.C. Sup. Ct.); B.C.
Nurses’ Union v. Mun. Pension Bd. of Trs., 2006 BCSC 132, 50 C.C.P.B. 77 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
87. See Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Envir-
onment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift,
ENVTL. L., Mar. 2009, at 43; Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safe-
guard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part II): Instilling a Fiduciary Obligation in
Governance, ENVTL. L., Mar. 2009, at 91.
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develop this infrastructure for the public good. This concept is acknowledged by
leaders in the sector. Consider, for example, a recent op-ed column by the CEO
of the Royal Bank of Scotland, in which he catalogued the company’s past fail-
ings and pledged to turn around its culture by “starting to build a bank the coun-
try can truly be proud of.”88
In summary, the duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries to take proactive steps to
invest (and encourage investment) for the long term, in a way that serves the best
interests of their beneficiaries. This means charting a course for investment that
takes account of important social and economic challenges, including effective
corporate governance, human rights, and sustainable development.
POLICY PROPOSALS
Below, we describe strategies that financial institutions could follow to take into
account these expectations and responsibilities. We also discuss ways in which
regulators and legislators may encourage institutions to adopt these strategies.
If one theme unites these proposals, it is a call for a shift in emphasis from re-
active regulatory and compliance strategies to proactive ones. In other words, rather
than satisfying themselves with a “check box” or “is it legal” approach to compli-
ance, institutions should anticipate future risks and consider how they may be ex-
pected to respond to these risks. Beyond compliance, there is an urgent need for
the financial sector to re-assert its social utility. Regulators, in turn, should shift
from a strategy of imposing detailed, complex rules that simply respond to past
failures, to strategies that do a better job of encouraging institutions to think
about and mitigate emerging long-term risks. Because no single institution can ad-
dress these risks acting alone, we also propose deeper collaboration between dif-
ferent players in the financial sector—particularly large issuers and investors.
A. THE FIDUCIARY OF THE FUTURE
Those who study success factors in capitalism stress the importance of sustain-
ing countervailing centers of power to balance and constrain private action.89 In
this context, the duty of loyalty to beneficiaries—extending beyond short-term
returns to broader issues—may be a requisite counterweight to “thin” political
markets, where the capacity to agree and deliver on needed change has been re-
latively low.90
This raises the following question for institutional leaders: if evolving social
norms and rising public expectations are becoming the driving force behind
the transition to sustainable economics and supportive financial systems, would
88. Ross McEwan, Op-Ed., Changing the Soul of RBS, GUARDIAN, Feb. 10, 2014, at 24.
89. See Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPI-
TALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds.,
2001).
90. See Rebecca Henderson & Karthik Ramanna, Managers and Market Capitalism 24 (Harvard Bus.
Sch. Working Paper No. 13-075, Nov. 9, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2231526.
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they rather help to guide this evolution, or be constrained by it? If institutions
continue to take a reactive approach, they will all but guarantee that the present
pattern of increasingly punitive fines, more complex regulation (which drives up
compliance costs), and dissolving public confidence in the financial sector will
continue. This pattern is not in the best interests of the individuals who rely
on financial services. As such, the duty of loyalty implies a proactive response,
carried out in accordance with the following broad principles.
First, the fiduciary of the future will need to be an ethical fiduciary: one that
recognizes and follows through on its responsibility to preserve and build on the
institutional system in which the fiduciary is embedded, and on which the fidu-
ciary relies. The financial sector generates wealth by directing resources to indi-
viduals and organizations that can do something constructive with them. These
individuals and organizations rely on more than investment for their enterprises
to succeed—their success is predicated on, among other things, a natural envir-
onment capable of sustaining their operations, an education system that prepares
that enterprise’s potential labor base for the workforce, and a stable, equitable
economy capable of sustaining a strong consumer base for the enterprise’s pro-
ducts or services. Absent this social and environmental infrastructure, the finan-
cial sector would have enormous difficulty finding worthwhile investment op-
portunities. This implies a normative duty to help preserve this infrastructure
by ensuring that externalities are properly priced and moral failures are ad-
dressed.91 The financial sector should be leading in developing efficient pricing
mechanisms and better framing such failures.
Recall that Harvard College v. Amory92 spoke to the preservation of capital. In
today’s context, the challenge in doing so is protecting against the ravages of a
degenerating environment and society—objectives that need to be achieved if
public trust and confidence in fiduciary services are to be preserved.
Second, these circumstances also imply an obligation to take a more integra-
tive approach to investment. Fiduciaries will be expected to identify and take ad-
vantage of opportunities to mobilize and allocate more of the capital and intel-
lectual resources they control for broader social, economic, and environmental
goals as part of their investment strategy. In many cases, this will mean seeking
out and investing in existing asset classes, but it may also mean devising new
ones, and new markets for these asset classes.93
This will require a shift from the zero-sum culture that has crept into finance—
where clients are seen as counterparties and the overriding assumption is that for
the service provider to “win,” the client will “lose”—toward a fiduciary culture,
where service providers place a premium on treating clients fairly and where
the goal is to win with clients rather than to win against them. The endpoint is
a financial sector imbued with a clearly articulated and generally accepted public
91. See id. at 28.
92. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
93. An integrative approach can be applied to governance as well as investment. See UNITED NA-
TIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE, INTEGRATED GOVERNANCE: A NEW MODEL FOR SUSTAINABILITY
(2014), available at http://goo.gl/AiZJou.
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purpose and perceived of as a contributor, rather than extractor, of value. A num-
ber of recent reports, most prominently the 2013 Salz Review of business prac-
tices at Barclays Bank, have highlighted the need for such a change in culture.94
Others have pointed to the business case for a culture of “integrity,”95 noting a
causal relationship between such a culture and long-term performance.96
Some have wondered whether this kind of change is possible. They point to
the “codes of conduct” promulgated by financial institutions in the years preced-
ing the crisis, which failed to change these institutions’ behavior in any signifi-
cant way.97 It is clear that the proliferation of codes of conduct has failed to ad-
dress the problems underlying the financial system. But this does not mean that
cultural change is impossible. Rather, it indicates that cultural change cannot be
achieved simply by putting a code of conduct on the books.
To understand why codes of conduct fail to achieve a change in culture, and
why this failure does not mean that any effort at cultural change is futile, it is ne-
cessary to briefly explain what we mean by “culture.” Culture consists of a set of
values, assumptions, and behaviors shared by a group of people.98 Culture influ-
ences the way in which managers set priorities and make hiring decisions. It in-
fluences how employees react to new markets and new financial technologies. It
influences whether they see regulators as adversaries or as partners. In this way,
culture can itself be seen as a form of regulation—a means by which an organiza-
tion can influence the actions of its employees to achieve shared goals.99 When we
view past attempts at effecting cultural change within the financial sector through
this prism, it becomes easier to understand why these efforts have not succeeded.
Self-regulation has three elements: standard setting, monitoring, and en-
forcement.100 For our purposes, standard setting refers to the creation of written
94. See ANTHONY SALZ, SALZ REVIEW: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BARCLAYS’ BUSINESS PRACTICES (2013)
[hereinafter SALZ REVIEW]; JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION
MAKING: FINAL REPORT (2012).
95. See, e.g., Werner Erhard & Michael C. Jensen, Putting Integrity into Finance: A Purely Positive
Approach (European Corporate Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 12-074, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1985594.
96. Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, The Value of Corporate Culture 22 (Univ. of Chi-
cago Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 13-80, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353486.
97. See, e.g., John Cassidy, Why Do Banks Go Rogue: Bad Culture or Lax Regulation?, NEW YORKER
ONLINE (Apr. 5, 2013), http://goo.gl/vl6E4K.
98. Culture has been defined in a number of ways, though these definitions tend to focus on
shared values, assumptions, and behaviors. See, e.g., OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (3d ed. 2010)
(“the ideas, customs, and social behavior of a particular people or society”); What Is Culture?, CTR.
FOR ADVANCED RES. ON LANGUAGE ACQUISITION, http://www.carla.umn.edu/culture/definitions.html
(last visited July 14, 2014) (“shared patterns of behaviors and interactions, cognitive constructs,
and affective understanding that are learned through a process of socialization”); DAVID G. BATES &
FRED PLOG, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 7 (2d ed. 1990) (“[t]he system of shared beliefs, values, customs,
behaviors, and artifacts that the members of society use to cope with their world and with one an-
other, and that are transmitted from generation to generation through learning”).
99. See Charles A. O’Reilly & Jennifer A. Chatman, Culture as Social Control: Corporations, Cults,
and Commitment, 18 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 157 (1996).
100. See CHRISTOPHER HOOD, HENRY ROTHSTEIN & ROBERT BALDWIN, THE GOVERNMENT OF RISK: UNDER-
STANDING RISK REGULATION REGIMES 24–28 (2001); Colin Scott, Regulating Everything: From Mega- to
Meta-regulation, 60 ADMIN. 61, 67–68 (2012).
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codes of conduct or ethical principles to govern an organization and their
communication throughout all levels of an organization. Monitoring is the
means by which an organization tracks compliance with these standards. Effec-
tive monitoring can occur only if managers at all levels of the organization under-
stand and support the applicable standards and develop ways of keeping track of
whether those under their supervision uphold these standards in their work. In
the case of firm or industry self-regulation, enforcement takes on a different
meaning than it does in the general regulatory context, as it refers primarily to
rewards rather than punishments. An organization enforces its standards by re-
warding employees who uphold these standards, whether through compensa-
tion, career advancement, or some other form of recognition.
Establishing a code of conduct only gets one past the standard-setting stage. To
see why standard-setting is not enough one need only look at the experience Bar-
clays has had with codes of conduct, as documented in the Salz Review. Different
businesses adopted different codes emphasizing different values. As a result,
there were no clear, universal standards for Barclays’ employees to look to.101
Further, these codes were not communicated effectively within the organiza-
tion—most employees were unaware of their existence.102 There was no discern-
ible effort to ensure managers supported these codes or integrated them into their
monitoring of their subordinates.103 Insufficient thought appears to have been
given to how the company’s reward system should be used to reinforce these
standards.104 If anything, the reward system, which tended to emphasize im-
mediate financial returns above all else, tended to undermine these standards.105
In other words, while skeptics would be right to note that the adoption of a
code of conduct will not in itself change an organization’s culture, it would be
wrong to argue that the failure of these codes of conduct automatically means
that cultural change is impossible. Rather, this failure calls for a more complete
and more serious effort at cultural change.
What would a roadmap for a shift from a zero-sum culture to a fiduciary cul-
ture look like? It would begin with a clear statement of principles that apply
throughout an organization. The ten Investment Beliefs adopted in the fall of
2013 by CalPERS, the $266 billion California Public Employee Retirement Sys-
tem, offers a model. The purpose of these beliefs is made clear from the outset:
“to provide a basis for strategic management of the investment portfolio, inform
organizational priorities, and ensure alignment between the Board and CalPERS
staff.”106
The principles reflect an enlightened understanding of the relationship between
the generation of wealth, sound institutions, and a sustainable environment. For
instance, Investment Belief 2 states that “[a] long time investment horizon is a
101. SALZ REVIEW, supra note 94, ¶ 8.14.
102. Id. ¶ 8.17.
103. Id. ¶¶ 8.18–8.19.
104. Id. ¶ 8.18.
105. Id. ¶ 11.40.
106. CALPERS, CALPERS INVESTMENT BELIEFS 1 (2013).
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responsibility and an advantage.”107 In light of this belief, CalPERS pledges to
“[c]onsider the impact of its actions on future generations of members and tax-
payers,” “[f]avor investment strategies that create long-term sustainable value,”
and “[a]dvocate for public policies that promote fair, orderly and effectively regu-
lated capital markets.”108 Investment Belief 9 concedes that “[r]isk to CalPERS is
multi-faceted and not fully captured through measures such as volatility or tracking
error.”109 To address this, CalPERS commits to “consider risk factors, for example
climate change and natural resource availability, that emerge slowly over long time
periods, but could have a material impact on company or portfolio returns.”110
Similar standards should be adopted throughout the financial sector. How-
ever, the adoption of standards is not enough. For one, these standards also
need to be communicated. This effort must begin with the board and the
CEO—as the leaders of the organization, they play a central role in defining
the culture of that organization.111 Further, for these standards to be taken ser-
iously, the board and CEO will need to communicate them through actions as
well as words—they must set an example by showing how they are adapting
their behavior in light of these standards.112 Only then will change start to filter
through the organization. Recent history shows that delegating this task entirely
to an institution’s compliance or risk management department is not a strategy
that is likely to succeed—risk management and compliance staff can only be ef-
fective if they have the confidence and clear backing of an institution’s leadership
and, in turn, its management.113 Otherwise, they will be powerless to prevent
unethical or self-destructive conduct by employees.114
Monitoring mechanisms can be developed through a similar approach. As
management comes to understand how the new standards serve the interests
and purpose of the organization, these standards will start to play a larger role
in the way managers monitor their subordinates day-to-day. The board should
supplement this informal change by embedding them into CEO performance
metrics and compensation plans. This process should continue until there are
effective monitoring mechanisms at all levels of the organization. This reflects
the widely acknowledged understanding that line management is the “first line
of defence” against corporate misconduct.115
Enforcement, as noted, should take the form of rewards rather than punish-
ments. Within an organization, the most powerful reward is likely advancement.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 6.
110. Id.
111. See ROBERT J. HOUSE ET AL., CULTURE, LEADERSHIP, AND ORGANIZATIONS: THE GLOBE STUDY OF SO-
CIETIES 62 (2004); EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP xi (4th ed. 2010).
112. See Bradley P. Owens & David R. Heckman, Modeling How to Grow: An Inductive Examination
of Humble Leader Behaviors, Contingencies, and Outcomes, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 787 (2012).
113. Kate Kenny, Banking Compliance and Dependence Corruption: Towards an Attachment Perspec-
tive 14–16, 19–22 (Edmond J. Safra Working Paper No. 38, Mar. 6, 2014), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2405615.
114. See, e.g., SALZ REVIEW, supra note 94, ¶ 2.33.
115. See, e.g., PAUL HOPKIN, RISK MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND GUIDANCE 192 (2013).
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Clear, demonstrated commitment to ethical standards should be a crucial factor
in making promotion decisions.116 In this way, an organization can both demon-
strate that it values compliance with these standards and ensure that its senior
management is populated by people who will continue to develop and place a
premium on them. Compensation may be another motivator although research
indicates that “pay for performance” mechanisms may be less effective than one
would assume.117 In any event, an organization should ensure that its compensa-
tion mechanisms do not work at cross-purposes with new standards (for exam-
ple, by encouraging short-termism). If pay for performance is retained, it should
be oriented toward long-term performance and be explicitly engineered to reward
prudence and a commitment to sustainability. Likewise, one might constitute a
board committee to focus on long-term issues and to be the advocate for the
long-term sustainability of the enterprise. The scale of the challenge ahead cannot
be underestimated. The leading institutions involved in the financial sector are
large and highly complex. They cannot be changed overnight. But the imperative
for change also cannot be overlooked—the alternative to proactive change from
within the financial sector is continued reactive, punitive action from regulators,
along with dissolving public confidence in critical fiduciary institutions.
B. COLLABORATION
Sound, sustainable governance requires an investment. One can understand
why issuers and investors would be reticent to make these investments unilater-
ally. It is challenging for an institutional investor to compete for investors seek-
ing a low-cost investment vehicle while at the same time incurring the short-term
costs necessary to improve the way their portfolio companies are governed.118
An issuer is unlikely to incur the costs necessary to ensure better governance
without being assured that it has the support of its largest investors. It is there-
fore unsurprising that, even though a culture of integrity appears to add value,
on average such cultures are weaker among public companies.119
This is what game theorists would call a “trust dilemma.”120 The short-term
benefits of “defecting”—refusing to make the necessary investment until some-
one else steps up—outweigh the short-term benefits of being the first to contri-
bute. The way out of the trust dilemma is cooperation: players of the game can
win if they agree to share the short-term costs necessary to make the investment.
Over time, as institutions interact in a repeated and consistent manner with one
116. See, e.g., SALZ REVIEW, supra note 94, ¶ 8.64.
117. See, e.g., Dan Ariely et al., Large Stakes and Big Mistakes, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 76 (2009); Ronald
Benabou & Jean Tirole, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 489 (2003); Edward L.
Deci, Richard M. Ryan & Richard Koestner, A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects
of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 659 (1999); see also Martin Dewhurst,
Matthew Guthridge & Elizabeth Mohr, Motivating People: Getting Beyond Money, MCKINSEY Q., Nov.
2009, at 1.
118. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist In-
vestors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 894–95 (2013).
119. See Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, supra note 96, at 8.
120. See WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA 219 (1992).
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another, trust develops into the default option—in other words, past trust pro-
vides the social glue that makes continued trust easier.
Collaboration is therefore essential to solving the challenges that threaten our
economy and our society. It drives more efficient and resilient use of resources
and deeper connectivity—personal and institutional. To some extent, coalitions
seeking to achieve better governance already exist. Some of these coalitions are
global in scope. The International Corporate Governance Network, an “investor-
led organization” with a membership of roughly 600 “leaders in corporate gov-
ernance” including institutional investors that collectively represent funds under
management of around $18 trillion, is one example.121 The signatories to the
United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, which include over
1,200 asset owners, investment managers, and professional service partners,
form another important, global group.122 There are other investor-led coalitions
with similar mandates that operate on a regional level, including Eumedion in
Europe, the Collective Engagement Working Group in the United Kingdom,
the U.S.-based Council of Institutional Investors, the Canadian Coalition for
Good Governance, and the Australian Council of Superannuation Investors.
These coalitions fulfill an important role. Their broad-based membership, con-
centrated within the investment community, gives them a mandate to represent
the interests of this community in dialogue with public companies and with govern-
ment. They have produced thoughtful proposals for governance reforms and used
their collective suasion to effect meaningful changes in regulation and behavior.123
We believe that the efforts of these organizations need to be supplemented by
another model for collaboration, guided by three broad principles. First, that the
only way to achieve the outcomes we seek is though collaboration between in-
vestment intermediaries and issuers. Too much of the dialogue over good gov-
ernance has been one-sided: asset owners telling issuers how they ought to
act. It is easy to understand why managers would respond defensively. The result
is that a relationship that ought to be cooperative is too often seen by both sides
as antagonistic or adversarial. It is only by seating both sides at the same table, as
equal partners with a common agenda, that they can forge the kind of trust ne-
121. About the ICGN, INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, https://www.icgn.org/about-icgn (last vis-
ited June 20, 2014);Membership, INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, https://www.icgn.org/membership
(last visited June 20, 2014).
122. Signatories to the Principles on Responsible Investment, UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLES ON RESPONSIBLE
INVESTMENT, http://www.unpri.org/signatories (last visited June 20, 2014).
123. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF INST. INVESTORS, U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: THE INVESTORS’ PERSPECTIVE
5–7 (2009), available at http://goo.gl/h3QkiB (proposing, among other things, that over-the-counter de-
rivatives be traded on regulated exchanges, that “investment advisers and brokers who provide invest-
ment advice to customers” be subject to fiduciary standards, that the SEC’s position as overseer of credit
rating agencies be strengthened, and that a systemic risk regulator be established); UNEP. FIN. INITIATIVE,
PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT—LONG-TERM MANDATES: A DISCUSSION PAPER (2014), available at
http://goo.gl/uVuK8z (this discussion paper marks the beginning of a consultation process with PRI
members aimed at identifying best practices in adopting a long-term investment horizon); see also
INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., WHAT ARE INVESTOR COALITIONS DOING ON FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM? 6–
12 (2013), available at http://goo.gl/ye9dQW (a summary of recent initiatives by investor coalitions
on financial regulatory reform).
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cessary to effect collaborative change. One promising initiative on this front may
be the Conference Board’s Task Force on Corporate/Investor Engagement, which
has brought together a group of directors of public companies and investors in
the United States to find solutions to help create a stronger corporate governance
system through effective engagement.124 Another is the SDX Protocol—the effort
of a working group of independent corporate directors and institutional inves-
tors to develop a framework for shareholder-director engagements.125
Second, it is likely that the only way to achieve timely, practical results is by
working with a small group of leading players. Large groups have legitimacy, and
they play an important role in defining social norms. But it is difficult for them to
effect focused, practical action. Consider, for example, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly. The work of these groups needs to be complemented by that of
smaller, more focused groups, whose members have the capacity to follow
through on their proposals. In international politics, the G20 is an example of
how effective such a group can be. It played a central role in framing the inter-
national response to the global financial crisis that began in 2008, because it was
small enough to act nimbly and reach consensus quickly, but inclusive enough
to ensure that its membership had the ability to transform consensus into mean-
ingful change.126
Third, such initiatives should be imbued with a sense of urgency, and they
should not be allowed to outlive their usefulness. In its 2013 report Now for
the Long Term, the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations recom-
mended that we build sunset clauses into international institutions.127 Without
them, a coalition may feel less of a need to justify its continued existence by de-
livering on clear goals. It may take its continued existence for granted, and thus
risk becoming largely self-congratulatory, with its members seeing membership as
an end in itself rather than as merely a means of achieving change. Worse still,
smaller groups are at risk of outliving their relevance—the fact that their members
were important players at the time their coalition was formed is no guarantee that
these members will continue to be important in ten or twenty years’ time. The
United Nations Security Council, whose permanent membership continues to re-
flect international politics as it existed in 1945, is an example of an institution that
has been allowed to outlive the environment it was fitted to.128
124. See The Conference Board Task Force on Corporate/Investor Engagement, CONFERENCE BOARD, http://
www.conference-board.org/taskforce (last visited June 20, 2014); Arthur H. Kohn & Julie L. Yip-
Williams, The Separation of Ownership from Ownership, DIRECTOR NOTES (Conference Bd., New York,
N.Y.), Nov. 2013, at 1.
125. S’HOLDER-DIR. EXCH., INTRODUCTION AND PROTOCOL (Feb. 2014), available at http://www.sdxpro
tocol.com/download/630/.
126. John Kirton, The Group of Twenty, in THE HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONS
AND INNOVATIONS 55, 58 (Thomas Hale & David Held eds., 2011).
127. OXFORD MARTIN COMM’N FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS, NOW FOR THE LONG TERM: THE REPORT OF THE
OXFORD MARTIN COMMISSION FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS 58 (2013) [hereinafter NOW FOR THE LONG TERM],
available at http://goo.gl/qRQIuJ.
128. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, United Nations Collective Security and the United States Security
Guarantee in an Age of Rising Multipolarity: The Security Council as the Talking Shop of the Nations,
10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 55, 84 (2009).
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Based on these principles, we propose a new coalition consisting of (say) ten
of the largest investors in the world, ten of the largest issuers in the world, and
ten of the largest financial intermediaries—a G30 for capital markets. This coali-
tion would create an infrastructure for asset managers and issuers to identify and
agree on key governance issues and to develop new industry standards and pro-
posals for regulatory reform. It would have a limited time horizon to achieve its
goals—between five and ten years—after which the group would be required to
disband. The coalition would need to justify its renewal by reference to concrete
accomplishments, and, if it is renewed, its membership would need to reflect
current market realities.
Such a coalition would need to set its own priorities for change, but the group
would likely be guided by the overarching objective of repairing the poisoned re-
lationship between issuers and investors, where issuers accuse investors of being
out to destroy company value to gain a short-term bump in share price and in-
vestors accuse issuers of destroying company value through subpar management
and self-enrichment. It is time to move past the illusion that investors and issuers
are on opposite sides. If anything, they represent opposite sides of the same coin.
There are signs that the protagonists of the opposing camps are starting to
climb down from their battlements and are coming to understand the importance
of engagement.129 Direct collaboration between leading investors and issuers,
with give and take on issues important to both constituencies, would be an im-
portant step in building trust and producing better outcomes for our capital mar-
kets and for society as a whole. Such a cooperative focus is more aligned with the
longer-term, “fiduciary” orientation we have attempted to outline.
There are a number of specific challenges of interest to issuers and investors
alike that such a group could easily address. While some of these challenges do
not directly relate to the broader, more systemic issues we have identified in this
article, working through them nonetheless achieves two related goals. First, co-
operation on smaller issues builds trust, which can be called on to resolve more
significant issues.130 Second, resolving sources of conflict and distraction, how-
ever minor, frees up the intellectual and financial resources necessary to engage
in longer-term thinking and to make better decisions for the long term.131
A starting point might be to find a way to reduce the number of frivolous
shareholder lawsuits, which have become endemic in the United States, and de-
liver few tangible benefits to investors.132 The challenge to be addressed is how
129. See, e.g., David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, The Mainstreaming of Shareholder Activism in
2013, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 26, 2013), http://goo.gl/Qeumhk; Alexandra Stevenson, No Barbarians at the
Gate; Instead, a Force for Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2014, at B1.
130. See WORLD RES. INST., BUILDING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE COOPERATION 22 (2012), available at
http://pdf.wri.org/building_international_climate_cooperation.pdf.
131. Research on decision making by individuals indicates that sources of stress tend to lead in-
dividuals to make myopic decisions. See, e.g., Jeremy R. Gray, A Bias Toward Short-Term Thinking in
Threat-Related Negative Emotional States, 25 PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 65 (1999).
132. A study by Cornerstone Research found that in 2012, 94 percent of M&A deals valued at
over $100 million, and 96 percent of M&A deals valued at over $500 million, were challenged
in court. Out of those lawsuits where Cornerstone could determine the outcome, 36 percent were
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to better differentiate lawsuits without merit from those that address real wrong-
doing and should be encouraged.133
Another fertile ground for collaboration might be proposing ways of reforming
executive compensation, in respect of both issuers and institutional investors, so
that executives’ pay better reflects the value they bring to the company, and so
that it is more likely to encourage executives to act in the long-term interests of
their firms. A more fundamental question that may be worth asking is whether
“pay-for-performance” actually does influence executives’ behavior, or whether
other external pressures, like analysts’ expectations and lower CEO job security,
now play a greater role in shaping executives’ behavior.134
Likewise with proposing reforms to the shareholder proposal process to en-
sure that only those proposals that have a real chance of succeeding are allowed
to make their way to a meeting of shareholders.135 At present, shareholder meet-
ing agendas are cluttered with proposals that enjoy little support and are certain
to fail;136 all they do is increase issuers’ paperwork and time burdens—costs that
are eventually passed on to investors.137
Improving the quality of corporate disclosure is another broad issue of com-
mon concern. Corporate disclosures have become bloated and overly compli-
cated. The purpose of disclosure was supposed to be to supply investors with
important information about the issuer and how it is managed. In today’s corpo-
rate disclosure, however, the “signal” is all too often buried in “noise.”138
dismissed, and 64 percent ended in settlement. Of those lawsuits that ended in settlement, less than 1
percent led to an increase in the merger price, while 81 percent—or four in five—delivered only ad-
ditional disclosures and fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys. Evidence from such settlements over the past
several years indicates that this disclosure rarely, if ever, actually affects whether the deal closes.
See ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
(2013), available at http://goo.gl/TRfQuj; see also Daniel Fisher, Lawyers Challenge Almost Every Mer-
ger, Cornerstone Study Shows, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2012), http://goo.gl/Jzg1gq; Joseph A. Grundfest &
Kristen Savelle, The Brouhaha Over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic,
and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325 (2013); Marc Wolinsky & Ben Schiresons, Deal Litigation
Rum Amok: Diagnosis and Prescriptions, REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG., Jan. 8, 2014, at 1.
133. Stephen M. Davidoff, Corporate Takeover? In 2013, a Lawsuit Almost Always Followed, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK ( Jan. 10, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/corporate-
takeover-in-2013-a-lawsuit-almost-always-followed/.
134. See generally Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay
in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677 (2011).
135. The support threshold that must be met before a proposal can be included on the agenda is
minimal—in most instances, the shareholders making the proposal need only have held $2,000
worth of securities for a set period (one year in the United States and two years in Canada). The
United Kingdom also provides for shareholder proposals, but the threshold for getting a proposal
on the agenda of a shareholders’ meeting is significantly higher than the one that applies in Canada
and the United States. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(2) (2013); Canada Business Corporations Reg-
ulations, 2001, S.O.R./2001-512, s. 46 (Can.); Companies Act 2006, c. 46, ss. 314–317 (U.K.).
136. In the 2013 proxy season, only 13 percent of the shareholder proposals submitted to U.S. is-
suers passed. Of those proposals that focused on social or political issues, less than 1 percent succeeded.
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2013 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 2 (2013), available at http://goo.gl/SbKi3Q.
137. In the past, these “fringe” proposals may have been a helpful means to highlight important
political and social issues. But today, they have largely been overtaken by day-to-day engagement be-
tween management and investors and other tools.
138. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Scheider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PENN. L.
REV. 101, 198 (2011); Mary Jo White, The Path Forward on Disclosure: Remarks to the National As-
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At present, however, there is no consensus on how exactly the problems that
have been identified with disclosure can be resolved. This does not mean that
dialogue on this issue would be premature. In fact, such a dialogue is already
starting to occur—in June 2014, the International Integrated Reporting Council,
a broad-based coalition that includes regulators, investors, and companies,
launched a new Corporate Reporting Dialogue that aims to “respond to market
calls for better alignment and reduced burden in corporate reporting.”139 Con-
tinued dialogue between issuers and investors on the issue of disclosure should
itself help identify ways to make progress on this issue.
Sustainability has become a defining issue for businesses and policy makers,
yet we continue to struggle to develop measurement systems and effectively
embed them in management and decision-making processes.140 This is as true
for the investor community as for issuers—witness the continuing focus on quar-
terly earnings estimates and the lack of sell-side research that extends beyond the
near term.141 In short order, this will no longer be due to a lack of appropriate
metrics: existing standard-setters (generally accounting bodies and stock ex-
changes), industry coalitions (e.g., Carbon Disclosure Project, Sustainability Ac-
counting Standards Board, International Integrated Reporting Initiative), and data
vendors (e.g., Bloomberg, MSCI, rating agencies, and proxy advisory services)
have been active in developing simple, relevant, comparable metrics designed
to correlate with long-term corporate performance and sustainability. Rather,
the key challenge will likely be to determine how to use these metrics to develop
a common language and common standards for reporting on and evaluating sus-
tainability.142 This is another area where a group of leading global issuers and
investors could collaborate and in doing so accelerate the shift within our capital
markets from a focus on reporting short-term financial results to one on an evol-
ving set of widely accepted metrics that relate to long-term value creation.143
Sustainability metrics can only influence issuers’ behavior through collabora-
tion between investors and issuers. At present, issuers have strong incentives to
underinvest in sustainability—paying the costs associated with making an issuer
more sustainable can make that issuer less attractive relative to its competitors in
the short run and give rise to discontent among investors. This dynamic might be
sociation of Corporate Directors 2013 Board Leadership Conference (National Harbor, Md., Oct. 15,
2013), available at http://goo.gl/7hepdN.
139. Press Release, Int’l Integrated Reporting Council, Corporate Reporting Dialogue Launched, Re-
sponding to Calls for Alignment in Corporate Reporting ( June 17, 2014), available at http://goo.gl/
vHrxKP.
140. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, DESIGNING FOR ACTION: PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE SUSTAINABILITY MEASURE-
MENT 13–16 (2013) (which gives a typology of sustainability metrics developed since the Rio Earth
Summit of 1992, while noting that there remain significant challenges involved in collecting many
of the data sets important to sustainability assessment despite improvements in technology).
141. See BREAKING THE SHORT-TERM CYCLE, supra note 65, at 3–4, 7.
142. For lists of some of the leading metrics, see PETER A. SOYKA & MARK E. BATEMAN, FINDING COM-
MON GROUND ON METRICS THAT MATTER 27 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/
IRRC-Metrics-that-Matter-Report_Feb-2012.pdf; UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS ON CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 10, 26 (2013), available at http://goo.gl/YvjvmM.
143. See, e.g., Dominic Barton & Mark Wiseman, Focusing Capital on the Long Term, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.–Feb. 2014, at 44, 49–55.
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changed if a critical mass of large issuers agrees to undergo these costs at the
same time, and if large investors agree to support this move.
Investors should be prepared to give this support. As CalPERS CEO Anne
Stausboll recently noted, “[a]s fiduciaries, it is our job to make sure investors,
businesses, and policymakers are responding aggressively and creatively to the
risks and opportunities associated with climate change and other sustainability
issues.”144 By developing high-level principles on the obligations of institutional
investors in capital markets, which take into account these investors’ unique sta-
tus as “universal owners”—investors with significant holdings across diverse in-
dustries and regions—institutions such as CalPERS can more effectively address
how they should invest and how they should behave as owners.
C. LEGAL MECHANISMS TO PROTECT FUTURE GENERATIONS
Market failures are often reflected in failures of political systems. In particular,
the problems that arise from the short-termist manner in which markets often
function is likely amplified by the short-termism of our political systems.145 De-
signing public institutions to counteract such systemic weaknesses is therefore
another challenge that must be addressed. One model might be to establish a
commissioner or ombudsperson for future generations, with the task of thinking
about, consulting, and speaking up for those who cannot speak for themselves in
the struggle to define public policy and regulatory mechanisms. A commissioner
or ombudsperson would be an independent officer reporting directly to the leg-
islature, and would be responsible for evaluating and reporting on the effects
proposed laws and regulations may have on future generations, and have legal
standing to challenge government actions that fail to take the interests of future
generations into account.146 Several countries have experimented with this
model, including New Zealand, Israel, and Hungary.147 The concept of an om-
budsperson with a singular focus on preserving options for future generations
could draw on similar mechanisms in respect of environmental and human
rights that are well developed in many jurisdictions, including the United King-
dom’s Sustainable Development Commission, which is an independent watch-
dog charged with monitoring and reporting on the government’s progress in
implementing its sustainable development strategy.148
The work of an independent ombudsperson or commissioner dedicated to future
generations could be supplemented by broader reforms throughout government
144. Press Release, Ceres, While Washington Waits, Investors Act on Climate Change ( Jan. 12,
2012), available at http://www.ceres.org/press/press-releases/while-washington-waits-investors-act-
on-climate-change.
145. See NOW FOR THE LONG TERM, supra note 127, at 45–47.
146. See SCI. & ENVTL. HEALTH NETWORK & INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW SCH., MODELS
FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS (2008), available at http://goo.gl/v5wvP3.
147. See Edith Brown Weiss, Implementing Intergenerational Equity, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTER-
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 100, 110–11 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M. Ong & Panos Merkouris
eds., 2010).
148. See supra note 146.
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that seek to minimize the influence short-term political interests have on govern-
ment planning and priorities. More day-to-day decision making on issues that
relate to sustainability, including infrastructure, health, and environmental pro-
tection, could be delegated to non-partisan, independent agencies, which would
have sufficient power and discretion to resist short-term political pressure, but
whose long-term priorities would continue to be defined by political institu-
tions.149 Assuming other effective accountability mechanisms, guaranteed term
lengths for senior administrators, which extend beyond the traditional four-
year election cycle, offer another means of securing independence from short-
term political pressure. Such a reallocation of power would allow governments
to “focus more on steering rather than rowing,”150 and in turn condition officials
on both the political and administrative ends of government to adopt a more
long-term mindset.151
Another set of legal mechanisms that merit consideration are prophylactic
rules which, like insurance, are a means of responding to risks that, while un-
certain or seemingly remote, are too significant to ignore. They can set clear, sim-
ple standards that keep essential systems functioning while regulators learn more
about a problem and determine whether a more nuanced solution ought to be
imposed.152 In other words, they exist to prevent failure while regulators gather
more information on a problem.153 Regulators should have both the legal power
and the confidence to impose these kinds of prophylactic mechanisms to deal
with problems as they arise, before they have complete certainty as to the nuan-
ces of that problem.
Another avenue is cultural. For example, it is argued that the success of East
Asian economies—most prominently China—owes a great deal to the long-term
perspective built into the cultural values that prevail in this region.154 Sociolo-
gists have found that individuals in this region tend to place a higher value on
perseverance and thrift—values that are oriented toward the future rather than
the present or the past—than individuals living in the West.155 This future-
oriented perspective, unsurprisingly, is reflected in government. For example,
in 2008, the South Korean government retained McKinsey & Company to
149. NOW FOR THE LONG TERM, supra note 127, at 58.
150. Id.; see also Guy Peters & John Pierre, Governance Without Government? Rethinking Public Ad-
ministration, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 223, 231 (1998).
151. Political oversight would also serve the goals of ensuring that the agency does not become a
victim of regulatory capture, ensuring that the agency continues to have sufficient powers to carry out
the long-term goals defined by political institutions (i.e., that they have not been weakened by new
circumstances that raise issues that fall outside the agency’s mandate or by overly intrusive judicial
review), and taking legislative action to resolve any problems that arise.
152. See Cristie L. Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Cri-
sis, 55 McGill L.J. 257, 298–99 (2010).
153. See FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY (2012) (which provides a host of in-
sightful and entertaining examples of how slowing down responses leads to better decision making).
154. See GEERT H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS,
AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 351–72 (2d ed. 2001); Geert Hofstede & Michael Harris, The Con-
fucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to Economic Growth, ORG. DYNAMICS, Spring 1988, at 5, 16–17.
155. See supra note 154.
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develop a study on the challenges and opportunities it will likely face through to
2020.156 There is room to explore ways to use political systems to overcome
(and perhaps gradually change) short-term biases that seem at present to be in-
grained in Western culture.
There may also be merit in exploring the use of existing legal instruments. For
example, a public express trust is a charitable trust established to further a spe-
cific public goal or to help the community in general.157 One can easily imagine
concepts such as the gradual transfer of a significant minority ownership interest
in private institutions to such a public trust with a future-oriented remit (much
like the focus of many sovereign wealth funds today).158 Thinking through ap-
propriate governance frameworks for such public trusts, as well as for their voice
in private institutions, might be instructive in itself.
D. RETHINKING REGULATION
It is remarkable that notwithstanding (perhaps, in part because of ) the flurry
of regulation in the five years after the “global financial crisis” scant attention has
been paid to some of the “big questions.” What are the characteristics of effective
financial services and regulation? Are complex financial products beneficial? Is a
complex financial system with larger institutions beneficial? How does (and how
should) our financial system add value? How can regulators better identify and
respond to emerging risks?
We noted earlier the hazards of regulatory frameworks. Instead of responding
to questions such as those above in a thoughtful way, most regulators have been
mired in a backward-looking, highly politicized adversarial process. Likewise,
rather than thinking about ways to innovate and develop, many financial institu-
tions are focused on defending their incumbency—from regulatory intervention
or in court. The result is a vicious cycle—complex rules breed complex systems
and an “is it legal” approach to product design and institutional cultures that can
put consumers at risk. A preoccupation with process and controls can often dis-
tract from focusing on innovation and the creation of sustainable value. It can
also promote regulatory tunnel vision rather than anticipating and tackling issues
before they become significant social concerns. To take a few simple examples,
insufficient attention has been paid to the rapid growth of the asset management
industry and the systemic risks posed by its shifting composition. This shift to
passive strategies has increased the potential for herding and correlated market
movements. The shift to illiquid funds creates market risk. The shift of market
risk from intermediaries to end investors and the process of de-equitization
156. Barton & Wiseman, supra note 61, at 3.
157. See Comm’rs for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531, 580–83
(Eng.); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 589 (1983); Vancouver Soc’y of Immigrant &
Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 10, ¶¶ 32–33 (Can.).
158. See BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, FIDUCIARY LAW AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTING: IN NATURE’S TRUST 227
(2013).
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and of institutional investors seeking to de-risk their portfolios appears to be fa-
voring restless capital just when our economy requires patience.159
One of the questions posed in the years following the 2008 financial crisis was
how the system permitted the “culture” of financial services to decline on the
scale it did. There was the recognition of the need to refocus on core expecta-
tions, rather than detailed policies and procedures. For example, the U.S. Fed-
eral Reserve recently issued a statement of bank capital planning that stipulated
the need for “economically intuitive” criteria by which directors and manage-
ment are to judge actions throughout a firm and for which they will be held
accountable.
As suggested above, one key is to focus on emerging risks, particularly for
those most vulnerable, rather than simply respond to past failures. “Big data”
promises to make available to regulators a wealth of searchable data, updated
in real time, that could be used to identify emerging problems before a crisis
strikes. Big data has already been proven to be effective in detecting emerging
problems in other fields—for example, a number of studies show that trends
in web searches can be used to detect outbreaks of influenza and other diseases
in real time.160 At least one study indicates that big data could be used to detect
problems in the financial sector: a recent analysis carried out using Google
Ngram, which charts the annual count of selected letter combinations, words,
and phrases appearing in books that have been digitized by Google, found
that mentions of “subprime lending” and “credit default swaps” became signifi-
cantly more frequent between 2003 and 2005—three years before the financial
crisis of 2008.161 Had regulators picked up on this “social trend” (i.e., the up-
swing in mentions of this activity), they might have had an opportunity to exam-
ine and start to address these issues before they came to a head.
While we wait for big data to develop, a number of emerging problems—and
opportunities—leap out for scrutiny, including those related to emerging pay-
ment technologies, retirement investment products, the use of social media,
and peer-to-peer financing. Each of these issues, and others, requires deep
thought about the business models of firms and their impacts on consumer ex-
pectations and behavior.
Another priority should be to take advantage of growing knowledge about effec-
tive regulatory instruments. For example, behavioral economics suggests that tradi-
tional disclosure requirements are ineffective.162 There is also a growing recogni-
tion of the need for consistent regulation—both geographically and functionally.
159. See Edward J. Waitzer, OSC Losing the Puck, NAT’L POST, June 4, 2014, at FP9.
160. See, e.g., Herman Anthony Carneiro & Eleftherios Mylonakis, Google Trends: A Web-Based
Tool for Real-Time Surveillance of Disease Outbreaks, 49 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE 1557 (2009);
Jeremy Ginsburg et al., Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search Engine Query Data, 457 NATURE
1012 (2009).
161. Joshua Mitts, Predictive Regulation (Mar. 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411816).
162. See Sah, Lowenstein & Cain, supra note 4, at 301–02; Cain, Lowenstein & Moore, supra
note 78, at 19–21.
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Private sector leadership, through collaborative self-regulation, may help to accel-
erate solutions.163
The U.S. Office of Financial Research, established under the Dodd-Frank Act
to “improve the quality of financial data available to policymakers and to facil-
itate more robust and sophisticated analysis of the financial system,”164 may
prove a useful mechanism for promoting a more holistic, forward-looking,
and effective regulatory paradigm. So, too, will our courts, we predict, as they
fill gaps in redefining the roles and responsibilities of agents and fiduciaries.165
Models for “soft law”—consensual norms that reflect “reasonable expecta-
tions” migrating into enforceable legal standards are rapidly evolving.166 Notable
examples are the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“Guid-
ing Principles”)167 and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.168
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights recently confirmed
that the Guiding Principles apply to financial institutions, and that they give rise
to a responsibility to conduct risk-based human rights due diligence (i.e., to as-
sess the risk that engaging or investing in a project will implicate a company in
human rights violations) and for such institutions to use their influence to miti-
gate human rights harm with which investee entities are directly linked.169
163. For example, the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada, the self-regulatory
organization that oversees investment dealers and trading activity on debt and equity marketplaces in
Canada, recently developed a Code of Conduct in relation to the Canadian Dollar Offered Rate
(CDOR) benchmark, set through self-reporting by Canadian financial institutions and used as a re-
ference rate for futures contracts, forward rate agreements, and swaps. The Code of Conduct sets
minimum standards for banks’ submission methodologies, internal oversight, and record retention.
An administrator will be appointed to oversee the scheme. See Press Release, Inv. Indus. Regulatory
Org. of Can., IIROC Publishes New Industry-Developed Code of Conduct for CDOR Submission
( June 2, 2014), available at http://goo.gl/oJDXLt. Another promising initiative has emerged in the
United Kingdom, where Britain’s largest banks and building society commissioned a report setting
out plans to establish a Banking Standards Review Council, which would be tasked with “promot-
[ing] high standards in U.K. banking.” See RICHARD LAMBERT, BANKING STANDARDS REVIEW 2–4 (2014),
available at http://www.bankingstandardsreview.org.uk/assets/docs/may2014report.pdf.
164. About the OFR, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ofr/about/Pages/de
fault.aspx (last visited July 15, 2014).
165. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 285–87 (2011) (who similarly predicts that courts will use
fiduciary law to impose constraints on powerful private actors); Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is
Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., forth-
coming 2014), available at http://goo.gl/K7gqIJ (noting that fiduciary law’s traditional role has been to
fill gaps left by other areas of the law, particularly where it appears that these gaps are being exploited
by opportunistic actors).
166. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 51 DUKE L.J. 621, 638–56 (2004); Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make Environ-
mental Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 259, 269 (1992); Kal Raustiala, Transgovernmental Networks and the Fu-
ture of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. (2002).
167. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
168. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), avail-
able at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf.
169. Letter from Craig Mokhiber, Chief, Dev. & Econ. & Social Issues Branch, Officer of the High
Comm’r for Human Rights, to Joris Oldenziel, Ctr. for Research on Multinational Corps. 6 (Apr. 26,
2013), available at http://goo.gl/opBSv2. This position was also articulated formally to the OECD
Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct in respect of a specific complaint brought against
the Norwegian government pension fund and a Dutch pension fund (APG), which argued that
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Initiatives similar to these with respect to human rights are now being
launched to develop consensual norms for sustainable financial systems. For ex-
ample, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) launched such an
inquiry in January 2014, aiming to identify and link a growing number of com-
plementary initiatives in “green” and sustainable finance.170 In the same month,
the Chinese Development Research Center of the State Council released an initial
exploration on Greening China’s Financial System.171 The leadership of emer-
ging nations in such an enterprise is particularly promising, to the extent it re-
flects or facilitates their engagement on these issues.
Another illustrative example is the “conflict minerals” disclosure mandate in
the Dodd-Frank Act which required the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion to include requirements for disclosures relating to conflict minerals originat-
ing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.172 The Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit recently ruled that requiring conflict minerals disclosure violated
the First Amendment’s prohibition against “compelled speech” on the basis
that the rule was not even reasonably related to the SEC’s mission of “preventing
consumer deception.”173 The lengthy and highly contested rulemaking process
and judicial review thereof highlight the risks of soft principles migrating into
hard law in a non-collaborative manner.
E. RE-ASSERTING THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
It is generally acknowledged that there is a pressing need to re-assert and pro-
mote public awareness of the social utility of the financial sector and markets. Pub-
lic perceptions of the sector are dominated by lack of understanding or trust.174
While the sector continues to enjoy heavy public subsidies,175 it is perceived to
have massively misallocated capital and generated sub-optimal social returns.
The cultures of financial institutions have become harder to manage and isolated
from the values and beliefs of the “millennial generation.”176 On the other side of
both should be viewed as multinational enterprises and thereby be required to conduct human rights
due diligence. Letter from Francesca Marotta, Officer-in-Charge, Dev. & Econ. & Social Issues
Branch, Officer of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, to Roel Nieuwenkamp, Chair, Working
Party for Responsible Bus. Conduct, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. ¶¶ 4, 15, 20–28 (Nov.
27, 2013), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/LetterOECD.pdf. For an in-
teresting discussion of risk-based human rights due diligence, see INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & BUS.,
STRIVING FOR EXCELLENCE: MEGA-SPORTING EVENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013), available at http://goo.gl/
V0NLuT.
170. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, INQUIRY INTO THE DESIGN OF A SUSTAINABLE FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
POLICY INNOVATIONS FOR A GREEN ECONOMY (2014), available at http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/
financialinquiry/.
171. SIMON ZADEK & ZHANG CHENGHUI, GREENING CHINA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM: AN INITIAL EXPLORATION
(2014), available at http://goo.gl/7v87gN.
172. Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 67716, 2012 WL 3611799 (Aug. 22, 2012).
173. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 370–73 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
174. See supra note 9.
175. It enjoys subsidies in a variety of forms, including access to subsidized funding and regula-
tory entry barriers.
176. See Morley Winograd & Michel Hais, How Millennials Could Upend Wall Street and Corporate
America (Brookings Inst. Governance Studies, May 28, 2014), available at http://goo.gl/Tr4fgu.
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the coin, there are extraordinary opportunities for the sector to develop (and better
explain) products, services, and markets that help mobilize capital and allocate
risk to address pressing social needs. Consider, for example, work underway on
new environmental,177 longevity,178 or social enterprise179 asset classes.
Accelerating this process presents a chance for the financial sector, working in
collaboration with governments and regulatory bodies, to “connect the dots”—
increasing public awareness of the vital role of financial services in mobilizing
and allocating capital and risk and creating sustainable wealth.
Likewise, such leadership by financial sector regulators and policy makers best
demonstrates that financial regulation is about more than protecting consumers
from deceptive products and practices. Rather, it should be to ensure, more
broadly, that society is well served and that consumers get a “fair deal.” This
should lead to the articulation of public stewardship responsibilities throughout
the financial services supply chain.
CONCLUSION
The financial services sector can be an essential force for good. Realizing this
possibility, however, will require deliberate action to correct the cultural and
structural problems that have persisted within this sector. The need for such ac-
tion is both clear and widely acknowledged. It is difficult to think of a sector that
has experienced more trust destruction in recent years than financial services.180
In a recent survey of financial services professionals, carried out by the CFA In-
stitute, over half (54 percent) of respondents pointed to a lack of ethical culture
within financial firms as the factor that has contributed most to this lack of trust
(a result consistent with surveys in previous years).181 At the same time, another
survey sponsored by the CFA Institute found that financial services executives
generally (91 percent) agree that ethical conduct is just as important as financial
success at their firms.182
Ultimately, these data points will converge and lead to regulatory action and
reform. For instance, in the Netherlands, all banking employees will soon be re-
quired to take an oath pledging that they will do their “utmost to preserve and
enhance confidence in the financial services industry” and put the interests of
both clients and society first.183 The Netherlands also plans to limit bankers’ bo-
177. RICHARD L. SANDOR, NATHAN CLARK, MURALI KANAKASABAI & RAFAEL L. MARQUES, CFA INST., ENVIR-
ONMENTAL MARKETS: A NEW ASSET CLASS ( Jan. 2014), available at http://goo.gl/svyoMR.
178. Can. Office of the Superintendent of Fin. Institutions, Longevity Insurance and Longevity
Swaps (Policy Advisory No. 2014-002, May 2014), available at http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/pp-
rr/ppa-rra/inv-plc/pages/longinslet.aspx.
179. Paul Chong & Linda Kleemann, The Future of Funding for Social Enterprises 9–11 (Kiel Policy
Brief No. 34, Sept. 2011), available at http://goo.gl/lQYuz8.
180. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Op-Ed., In No One We Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2013, at SR4.
181. CFA INST., supra note 11, at 22.
182. Id.
183. Maud van Gaal, Dutch Bankers Swear to God as Trust in Lenders Slumps, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6,
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nuses to 20 percent of pay—an even lower cap than the 100 percent cap pro-
posed by the European Union.184 Surely, the sector itself can craft more effective
responses to societal expectations.
Though other jurisdictions have not gone as far as the Netherlands yet, the
trajectory of the law is clear. Regulators, legislators, and courts are expanding “fi-
duciary” duties based on reasonable expectations and, increasingly, are informed
by the principle that finance should serve the public interest. Absent industry
leadership, politics will likely accelerate this dynamic, with those institutions
that are most visible being the most likely to be held to account first.
Viewed broadly, the financial sector has a choice. It can continue to be reactive
and seek to maintain an unsustainable status quo, or take a proactive and colla-
borative approach that is responsive to this rapidly emerging dynamic. The im-
mediate consequences of choosing the first option are already well known—
more complex regulation that implies higher compliance costs, higher penalties,
lower public confidence, and, ironically, a less effective financial system. The
longer term consequences of a failure to be proactive pose even greater environ-
mental and social as well as financial threats.185
This paper has aimed to sketch out some illustrative elements of what an al-
ternative approach might look like. We have tried to begin to map out how a
“fiduciary of the future” might function and how institutions should begin to
change their culture to align with this perspective. We have also explored
how institutions should collaborate to initiate and achieve systemic change
(and share the necessary costs of doing so). Finally, we have considered the
role regulators and political institutions can play in supporting the transition
to a more sustainable economy, both by establishing new institutions that
imbue government with a long-term perspective and by designing regulation
so as to more effectively achieve such shared goals.
In his first economic message, Pope Francis noted that “whatever is fragile,
like the environment, is defenseless” against markets that are devoid of social
purpose and that hence show a “lack of real concern for human beings.”186
He went on to argue that a financial system imbued with ethical values
“would make it possible to bring about balance and a more human social
order.”187 A few months later, at the 2014 World Economic Forum, the Pope
further argued that capitalism should be animated by “a renewed, profound
and broadened sense of responsibility” to further the common good.188
As a major financial institution, the Vatican has hardly acquitted itself as a
model for others to follow.189 Yet the Pope’s remarks unquestionably reflect a
184. See supra note 183.
185. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 23 (9th ed. 2014).
186. Pope Francis, Evangelii Gaudium, VATICAN PRESS, Nov. 24, 2013, ¶¶ 55–56.
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2014), http://goo.gl/X7mL8N; Michael J. de la Merced, Pope Urges Davos Notables to Remember the
Less Fortunate, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK ( Jan. 21, 2014, 5:58 PM), http://goo.gl/bHRXhe.
189. See Rachel Sanderson, Scandal at God’s Bank, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2013, at 1.
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broader current in public opinion, one that is increasingly reflected in the ac-
tions of regulators and courts: the understanding that the market system has
achieved tremendous successes and continues to have enormous potential to
serve the common good, but a belief that this potential can only be achieved
so long as the financial sector is guided by a sense of social purpose. This re-
quires a clear understanding of the degree to which it is embedded within,
and relies upon, a shared social infrastructure. This may well be the inflection
point that our financial sector will either embrace or have imposed upon it.
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